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Takings Claims Against the Federal Government -  In General
A. The just compensation clause of the fifth amendment states ".. . nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. 
Const. amend. V.
1. Eminent Domain
When the federal government condemns land to create a public 
recreation area, it must pay the property owner "just compensation." 
See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land. 441 U.S. 506 (1979).
2. Inverse Condemnation
While a typical taking occurs when the government condemns property 
under its power of eminent domain, the doctrine of "inverse 
condemnation" is based on the proposition that a taking may occur 
without the initiation of formal proceedings. First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County. 482 U.S. 304, 
315 (1987). The Supreme Court has observed that the "self-executing 
character of the constitutional provision with respect to compensation" 
entitles a landowner to bring an action in inverse condemnation when 
government action works a taking of property rights. Id.
3. Physical Takings
The Supreme Court has ruled that physical occupation of property, no 
matter how small, effects a taking. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982). A permanent physical 
occupation of property by the government is a taking without regard 
to the public interests served. Id. at 426.
4. Regulatory Takings
The Supreme Court in 1922 recognized that regulatory action may also 
constitute a "taking" that requires just compensation. In Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), the Court stated "while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far 
it will be recognized as a taking."
5. Jurisdiction
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims (formerly the Claims Court) in 
Washington, D.C. has exclusive jurisdiction over takings claims against 
the federal government for sums in excess of $10,000. Lesser claims 
may be brought in either the U.S. Court of Federal Claims or federal 
district court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491(a).
In Keene Corp. v. United States. 113 S. Ct. 2035 (1993), the Supreme 
Court held that under 28 U.S.C. § 1500, the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims may not exercise jurisdiction over an action if the plaintiff has 
brought a claim in another court based on the same operative facts. 
The government’s view is that Keene prohibits a plaintiff from bringing 
a takings claim based on a permit denial in the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims while simultaneously challenging the Corps’ permit denial in 
federal district court. The Federal Circuit is currently considering the 
government’s theory in Loveladies Harbor v. United States.
If plaintiffs are unable to bring simultaneous actions, they may run 
afoul of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims’s 6-year statute of 
limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501. For example, in Creppel v. United 
States. 30 Fed. Cl. 323 (1994), a number of landowners had brought an 
action in 1977 in federal district court challenging the validity of a 1976 
Corps order that scaled back a proposed land reclamation project. In 
1984, the district court ordered that the original project should 
proceed, but stayed the order until EPA could decide whether to 
commence veto proceedings. In 1985, EPA decided to veto the 
project, and the Agency’s veto was upheld by the district court in 1988. 
In 1991, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging 
a taking without just compensation stemming from the cancellation of 
the original project. The Court of Federal Claims held that the Corps 
order issued in 1976 was a final action, and thus the statute of 
limitations on all claims arising from the order began to run in 1976. 
The court noted, however, that "[h]ad plaintiffs filed suit in this court 
earlier and had the suit been either suspended or dismissed, an 
argument for section 1500 tolling might exist." Id.
B. Overview of Supreme Court Tests for Regulatory Takings Claims
1. Regulatory Takings Test
The Supreme Court has emphasized that there is no set formula for 
determining when government action effects a taking. The Court has, 
however, ruled that the regulation of property may effect a taking of
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property if the regulation either:
fails to substantially advance a legitimate state interest, or
o  denies an owner economically viable use of his land. See 
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); 
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
2. Categorical Rule
If government action denies a landowner all economically beneficial or 
productive use of his property, a taking will be found unless the 
claimant’s proposed use would constitute a nuisance under 
"background principles" of state law. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893, 2899 (1992).
3. Ad Hoc Factual Inquiry
In engaging in essentially ad hoc factual inquiries, the Court has 
identified three factors of particular importance in determining 
whether government action works a taking: (1) the character of the 
government action; (2) the economic impact of the regulation; and (3) 
the extent to which the action interferes with reasonable investment- 
backed expectations. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York. 
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
a. Character of the Government Action
If the government’s action can be characterized as a physical 
invasion of the property, a court will be more likely to find a 
taking. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
b. Economic Impact of the Regulation as Applied
In deciding whether a regulation effects a taking, the Supreme 
Court has considered the economic impact of a regulation by 
comparing the value of the property before and after the 
regulation’s interference with the property. See Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis. 480 U.S. 470, 497 
(1987). However, mere diminution in property value as a result 
of government regulation does not amount to a compensable 
taking. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York. 438 U.S. 
104 (1978).
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In determining whether government regulation amounts to an 
unconstitutional taking, courts will also consider the impact of 
the action on the property owner’s reasonable investment- 
backed expectations. See Penn Central. 438 U.S. at 124. In 
Penn Central, the Supreme Court observed that because a New 
York City landmark law did not interfere with current uses of 
the parcel and allowed a reasonable return on the original 
investment made in the property, the law did not interfere with 
plaintiffs investment-backed expectations. Id. at 136. A 
property owner challenging restrictions that the government 
imposed after the owner acquired the property has a better 
chance of bringing a successful takings claim. See, e.g., Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2889 (1992) 
(observing that plaintiff was not subject to beachfront 
development restrictions at the time he acquired the property).
4. Existence of Compensable Property Interest
Before a claimant may recover just compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment, she must establish that, at the time of the alleged taking, 
she held an interest in the property "taken" by the government. Lucas. 
112 S. Ct. at 2899-900; Lacey v. United States. 595 F.2d 614, 619 (Ct. 
Cl. 1979). In the absence of such an interest, a claimant cannot 
proceed with a takings claim as to the "unowned" land. See, e.g., 
Plantation Landing Resort. Inc. v. United States. 30 Fed. Cl. 63 (1993) 
(holding that no property interest existed where 50.5 acres of 
claimant’s 59-acre project lay below the mean high water mark and 
thus could only be owned by a private party if that party obtained a 
reclamation permit from the State of Louisiana; claimant had obtained 
such a permit but had allowed the permit to expire, which extinguished 
the claimant’s compensable interest in the 50.5 acres); 1902 Atlantic 
Ltd, v. United States. 26 Cl. Ct. 575 (1992) (holding that significant 
revenue losses suffered by plaintiff during Section 404 permit review 
process were not compensable as a temporary taking; the plaintiff was 
never entitled to a section 404 permit and thus its economic interest 
in obtaining the permit was not a compensable property interest).
c. Interference with Investment-Backed Expectations
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II. Takings Claims Against the Federal Government Arising in the Context of the
Federal Wetlands Regulatory Program_________________ _____________________
A. Overview Of Wetlands Takings Claims
By far the most developed case law concerning federal regulatory takings has 
arisen in the context of federal wetlands regulation under Section 404 of the 
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344. Many of the issues considered by the 
U.S. Court of Federal Claims in the wetlands context are relevant to possible 
takings claims based on other federal environmental and land use regulations.
1. In deciding whether the denial of a Section 404 permit gives rise to a 
compensable taking, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims has generally 
focused on the second prong of the Supreme Court’s taking test; 
namely, whether the denial of a Section 404 permit denies 
economically viable use of the property.
2. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has recognized that the requirement 
that a property owner obtain a Section 404 permit before filling 
wetlands advances legitimate government interests and promotes the 
public welfare. See, e.g., Deltona Corp. v. United States. 657 F.2d 
1184, 1192 (Cl. Ct. 1981), cert. denied. 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); 
Loveladies Harbor. Inc. v. United States. 15 Cl. Ct. 381, 388 (1988) 
(Loveladies Harbor I). Accordingly, a challenge based on the assertion 
that the Section 404 regulations do not advance legitimate state 
interests is unlikely to succeed.
B. Application of Ad Hoc Factual Inquiry
1. Character of the Government Action
In Loveladies Harbor I, 15 Cl. Ct. at 391, the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims observed that the denial of plaintiff's Section 404 permit was 
not equivalent to a "physical destruction or intrusion attendant with an 
act of eminent domain." Nonetheless, where the government draws a 
line in time, prohibiting activity that had formerly been allowed, a 
taking may be found if the government is attempting to achieve a 
general public goal at the expense of an individual landowner. Florida 
Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. at 168-69; Bowles v. United 
States. 1994 WL 102117, *15n. 14. (Fed. Cl. March 24, 1994).
2. Economic Impact of the Regulation as Applied
The fact that a Section 404 permit is denied, without more, does not
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effect an unconstitutional taking. United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 128 (1985); See Loveladies Harbor I, 15 Cl. Ct. 
at 391. To determine economic impact, the Court of Federal Claims 
will compare the fair market value of the property before and after 
permit denial. Bowles v. United States. 1994 WL 102117, *6 (Fed. Cl. 
March 24, 1994).
a. Mere Diminution in Value Is Not Compensable
In Deltona Corp. v. United States. 657 F.2d 1184, 1193 (Ct. Cl. 
1981), the Court of Claims ruled that mere diminution in value 
as a result of the government’s denial of the highest and best 
use of property does not, by itself, establish a taking.
b. Must Show Loss of Economically Viable Use
The denial of a Section 404 permit may effect a taking of 
property if the effect of the denial is to prevent economically 
viable use of the land in question. See United States v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes. Inc.. 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Bowles v. 
United States. No. 303-88L, 1994 WL 102117, at *10-11 (Fed. 
Cl. Mar. 24, 1994); Florida Rock Indus. v. United States. No. 
91-5156, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4401 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10,1994); 
Formanek v. United States. 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992) (Formanek 
II); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States. 21 Cl. Ct. 153 
(1990) (Loveladies Harbor II).
(1)  Developable Uplands
The existence of developable uplands within the 
wetlands parcel may provide sufficient value to defeat a 
takings claim. See Deltona Corp., 657 F.2d at 1192 
(ruling that the denial of a Section 404 permit does not 
effect a taking where property contains uplands that 
could be developed without a Corps permit). In Jentgen 
v. United States. 657 F.2d 1210,1213 (Cl. Ct. 1981), cert. 
denied. 455 U.S. 1017 (1982), the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims ruled that the denial of a Section 404 permit did 
not amount to a taking where the Corps offered a 
permit to allow the development of more than 20 acres 
of the 80 acres covered by the permit and the tract 
contained an additional 20 acres of developable upland 
not subject to Corps permitting requirements.
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The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has, however, 
awarded compensation for a taking based on a permit 
denial despite the presence of upland areas where the 
upland property is surrounded by wetlands and cannot 
be accessed without a Corps permit. Loveladies Harbor 
II, 21 Cl. Q . at 159; Formanek II. 26 Cl. Ct. 332.
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has held, however, 
that the mere presence of uplands, without a showing 
that a market exists for proposed uses of the uplands, 
fails to defeat a takings claim. Formanek II. 26 Cl. Ct. 
332.
(2) Recreational and Conservation Uses
In Loveladies Harbor II. 21 Cl. Ct. at 158-59, the 
government unsuccessfully argued that sufficient 
economically viable uses remained in the property 
subject to a permit denial because the property could be 
used for hunting, bird watching, agriculture, 
conservation, a marina, or as a mitigation site for other 
developers. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims rejected 
these arguments because the government failed to show 
that the proposed uses were reasonably probable or that 
a market existed for such uses.
(3) Offers to Purchase
The existence of a market in which a property owner 
could have obtained value for its property may be 
sufficient to defeat a takings claim. "The market from 
which a fair market value may be ascertained need not 
contain only legally trained (or advised) persons who 
fully investigate current land use regulations; ignorance 
of the law is every buyer’s right." Florida Rock Indus. v. 
United States. No. 91-5156, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4401, 
at *15 n.12 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10, 1994).
An offer by a conservation group to purchase the 
property at a fraction of the property’s value before the 
permit denial does not demonstrate an "economically 
viable use" sufficient to prevent a court from finding that 
the permit denial effected a taking. Formanek v. United 
States. 18 Cl. Ct. 785 (1989) (Formanek I).
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3. Interference with Investment-Backed Expectations
In Ciampitti v. United States. 22 CL Ct. 310, 321 (1991) (Ciampitti II). 
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled that the denial of a Section 404 
permit did not effect a taking where the plaintiff purchased the 
property in 1983, had knowledge of the restrictions applicable to the 
property, and agreed to purchase restricted wetlands as part of a 
package deal that included developable uplands. Because the plaintiff 
had ample warning of the likelihood that the wetlands could not be 
developed, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled that the permit 
denial did not interfere with the plaintiff's reasonable investment- 
backed expectations.
In Deltona Corp., 657 F.2d at 1193, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims 
acknowledged that the stiffening of Corps requirements that resulted 
in a denial of a Section 404 permit "substantially frustrated" plaintiff's 
reasonable investment-backed expectations. However, the denial did 
not effect a taking because economically viable uses remained for the 
property. Moreover, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims observed that 
it was "‘quite simply untenable’" that property owners may establish a 
taking simply by demonstrating that "‘they have been denied the ability 
to exploit a property interest that they heretofore had believed was 
available for development.’" Id. (quoting Penn Central. 438 U.S. at 
130). But see Nollan. 483 U.S. at 841 n.2 (observing that building on 
one’s own land is a right, not a governmental benefit).
C. Ripeness
1. Submission of a Permit Application
In Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League. Inc. v. Marsh. 715 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 
1983), the court ruled that a takings claim made before plaintiff 
complied with Corps permit procedures was premature. See also 
United States v. Byrd. 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979) (ruling that 
plaintiff could not assert a takings claim until after applying for a 
Section 404 permit because of the possibility that the Corps might issue 
a permit); Riverside Bayview Homes. 474 U.S. at 127 (stating that 
"[o]nly when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial is to 
prevent ‘economically viable’ use of the land in question can it be said 
that a taking has occurred").
2. Final Decision
In Loveladies Harbor I. 15 Cl. Ct. at 386, the U.S. Court of Federal
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Claims rejected arguments by the government that plaintiff's inverse 
condemnation claim was not ripe for review after the denial of a single 
Section 404 permit application. The court distinguished Supreme 
Court rulings that had dismissed takings claims as unripe because there 
had been no final determination by the government as to the number 
of dwelling units that would be allowed. The court observed that the 
Corps’ permit denial was based on environmental concerns and that 
any development on the property would have similar environmental 
impacts, demonstrating that development on the property was 
unacceptable per se. Moreover, the court noted that the Corps failed 
to provide any alternative development options. Accordingly, the case 
was ripe for judicial review.
In Beure’-Co. v. United States. 16 Cl. Ct. 42 (1988), the U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims also ruled that the Corps’ denial of a Section 404 
permit was a final decision because the denial, based on ecological 
concerns, could be read as an intention to deny any future 404 
applications for discharges onto the subject property. The court noted 
that the Corps did not suggest any modifications or appropriate or 
practical mitigation measures that would have allowed development of 
the property. See also Formanek I. 18 Cl. Ct. at 793 (holding 
plaintiff’s taking claim ripe for review where the Corps’ decision to 
deny a permit could be read as foreclosing development on any part 
of the wetlands complex).
3. Requirement to Seek a Variance Inapplicable
In Beure’-Co., 16 Cl. Ct. at 49, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims 
rejected arguments by the government that plaintiffs inverse 
condemnation claim was not ripe because he had not sought a 
"variance" from the Corps’ denial. The court found no procedures in 
Corps regulations that would allow a property owner to seek a variance 
or analogous relief from a permit denial.
4. Denial of Necessary State Approvals Does Not Bar Federal Claim
In Ciampitti v. United States. 18 Cl. Ct. 548, 552-53 (1989) (Ciampitti 
I), the U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled that New Jersey’s denial of 
a Coastal Zone Management Plan consistency determination, a 
prerequisite to the granting of a Section 404 permit, did not render 
plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim premature. The court observed 
that the Corps’ permit denial was based on grounds independent of the 
State’s denial of a consistency determination. The court stated that a 
plain reading of the Corps’ decision to deny the permit application
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indicated that the Corps would have denied the permit regardless of 
the State’s action. The court also ruled that the plaintiff's failure to 
even apply for necessary state water quality certification did not render 
the claim premature.
D. The "Parcel as a Whole"
In determining the economic impact of the government action, the court will 
consider the impact on the "parcel as a whole." Penn Central. 438 U.S. at 
115. Thus, if an owner has been denied economic use of part of a parcel but 
retains economic use of other parts of the parcel, a court will not find a 
taking. This rule is in flux. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council 112
S.Ct. 2886 (1992). Florida Rock Industries v. United States. 1994 WL 83987 
(Fed. Cir., March 10, 1994).
1. Property Sold Before the Time of the Taking Excluded
In Loveladies Harbor I. 15 Cl. Ct. at 392, the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims excluded from the parcel as a whole property that was part of 
plaintiff's original purchase but that had been sold by the time of the 
alleged taking. See also Formanek II. 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (excluding from 
consideration portions of the property sold before the date of the 
Corps’ permit denial).
2. Noncontiguous Property Generally Excluded
In Penn Central. 438 U.S. at 115, 130-31, the Supreme Court defined 
the "parcel" as including only the property that was subject to the 
landmark designation. The court noted that plaintiff owned numerous 
other properties throughout Manhattan but did not include those 
noncontiguous properties in the property against which the 
government’s action was measured.
Citing Penn Central, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in Loveladies 
Harbor I. 15 Cl. Ct. at 392, excluded parcels that were part of the 
plaintiffs original purchase but were no longer contiguous to the 
property allegedly taken by the government and were not affected by 
the Corps’ permit denial.
However, in Ciampitti v. United States. 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991) 
(Ciampitti II). the U.S. Court of Federal Claims included 
noncontiguous property held by the plaintiff in the "parcel as a whole." 
The court expressed some concern about the lack of contiguity but 
noted that the plaintiff had viewed both portions as a single parcel for
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purposes of purchase and financing. The court also stated that at the 
time the plaintiff was negotiating for the acquisition of the property, 
he retained ownership of lots that linked the two portions.
3. Legally Undevelopable Property Excluded
In Loveladies Harbor I. 15 Cl. Ct. at 393, the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims excluded from the parcel as a whole a portion of contiguous 
property that could not be developed because the State of New Jersey 
had previously denied necessary development permits for that portion 
of the property.
In Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 904-05 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986) (Florida Rock II), cert, denied. 479 U.S. 1053 (1987), the 
court considered the parcel to consist of only the 98 acres subject to 
plaintiff's permit application (which the Corps denied) rather than the 
entire 1,560-acre wetland tract owned by plaintiff. In this case, the 
Corps limited the area of the permit application to 98 acres--the 
amount of land that could be mined in the three-year period (the 
normal duration of Corps permits). The court declined to speculate 
on the outcome of future permit applications. Presumably, the plaintiff 
would have been required to apply for 15 98-acre permits, ripening 15 
successive takings claims in order to obtain just compensation for the 
entire parcel. This result was rejected by subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions.
4. Developable Uplands Included
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has consistently included upland 
portions of the property (i.e., portions of the property that are not 
subject to Corps regulation) in the "parcel as a whole."
In Deltona Corp. v. United States. 657 F.2d at 1192, the U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims held that the denial of a Corps permit did not effect 
a taking because plaintiff retained 111 acres of upland that could be 
developed without a Corps permit. See also Jentgen v. United States. 
657 F.2d at 1213 (Cl. Ct. 1981) (the existence of developable uplands 
provided economically viable uses sufficient to defeat a takings claim).
In Ciampitti II. 22 Cl. Ct. at 318, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims 
included noncontiguous upland portions of plaintiffs property that 
were part of plaintiffs original purchase, stating that ”[i]n the case of 
a landowner who owns both wetlands and adjacent uplands, it would 
clearly be unrealistic to focus exclusively on the wetlands, and ignore
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whatever rights remain in the uplands."
In Loveladies Harbor II. 21 Cl. Ct. at 159, the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims considered the value of one acre of upland owned by plaintiff 
that was surrounded by wetland. The court concluded, however, that 
the upland did not provide sufficient value to defeat a takings claim 
because a denial of a permit to fill surrounding wetlands had 
effectively precluded development of the upland as well.
In Formanek II. 26 Cl. Ct. 332, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled 
that the presence of 12 acres of upland on a 112-acre tract was not 
sufficient to defeat a takings claims. The court noted that a fill permit 
would be required to access the upland portions of the property and 
that the government failed to demonstrate that a market existed for 
proposed uses of the uplands.
E. Temporary Takings
1. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has ruled that a sixteen-month delay 
in the processing of a Section 404 permit by the Corps (during which 
time the value of the property dropped) did not amount to an 
"extraordinary delay" and thus did not give rise to a temporary takings 
claim. Dufau v. United States. 32 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1524 (Cl. Ct. 
1990).
2. In 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. United States. 26 Cl. Ct. 575 (1992), a property 
owner alleged a temporary taking based on the Corps’ initial denial of 
a Section 404 permit. The property owner first challenged the Corps’ 
permit denial in federal district court, and the court ordered the Corps 
to either reconsider the permit denial or institute condemnation 
proceedings. The Corps denied the permit a second time and only 
after a further court order did it issue a Section 404 permit. The 
property owner filed suit in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims seeking 
compensation for the five-year delay in the project caused by the 
Corps’ permit denials. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled that 
the conduct of the Corps did not effect a temporary taking because 
plaintiff did not have a property right to the fill permit during the time 
in question, nor did the administrative review process amount to 
"extraordinary delay." Ld. at 578.
3. In Tabb Lakes. Inc, v. United States. 26 Cl. Ct. 1334 (1992), aff' d sub 
nom. Tabb Lakes. Ltd. v. United States. 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993), 
plaintiffs brought a temporary takings claim based on the economic 
impact of a Corps cease-and-desist order. Plaintiffs had previously and
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successfully challenged in federal court the Corps’ basis for exercising 
jurisdiction over the area in question. Tabb Lakes. Ltd. v. United 
States. 715 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Va. 1988) (ruling that the Corps could 
not exercise jurisdiction over the site based on the "migratory bird rule" 
because the Corps had not adopted the rule in accordance with the 
formal rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act), 
a ff'd. 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989). In the later case, the U.S. Court 
of Federal Claims ruled that plaintiffs were not entitled to 
compensation for the three-year period during which the Corps 
asserted jurisdiction over the property because plaintiffs were able to 
sell upland lots during this time and were thus not deprived of all 
economically viable use of their property. Tabb Lakes. 26 Cl. Ct. at 
1352.
F. The Nuisance Exception
If the claimant’s proposed use of its property would amount to a nuisance, just 
compensation is not required even if the government’s action precludes all 
use; this is so because plaintiff can have no property interest in carrying out 
a nuisance. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 112 S.Ct. at 2899. The 
government has the burden of establishing that the proposed use would 
constitute a nuisance. Bowles v. United States. 1994 W L 102117, *6 (Fed. Cl., 
March 24, 1994).
1. Discharge of Dredged or Fill Material Not a Nuisance
In Florida Rock Indus. v. United States. 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 166-67 (1990) 
(Florida Rock III), vacated and remanded on other grounds. No. 91- 
5156, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 4401 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10, 1994), the U.S. 
Court of Federal Claims ruled that plaintiff’s proposed limestone 
mining in wetlands did not constitute a public nuisance because the 
activity did not significantly increase the risk of contaminating area 
aquifers. The court also noted that there were many limestone 
quarries in the vicinity of plaintiff’s property. The court observed that 
"the assertion that a proposed activity would be a nuisance merely 
because Congress chose to restrict, regulate, or prohibit it for the 
public benefit indicates circular reasoning that would yield the 
destruction of the fifth amendment." Id. at 168.
In Loveladies Harbor II. 21 Cl. Ct. at 154 n.3, the U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims recognized that the plaintiffs proposed filling of 
wetlands for residential development would not constitute a nuisance. 
In doing so, the court noted that the State of New Jersey had granted 
state water quality certification and that it is the State’s function to
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regulate land use. The court deferred to the State’s findings 
concerning pollution arising from the activity. Id.
2. Wetlands Development as Equivalent to a Nuisance
A few state courts have ruled that the development of wetlands 
amounts to a public harm that can be prohibited under the 
government’s police powers without giving rise to an unconstitutional 
taking. See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972) 
(ruling that a county ordinance prohibiting the filling of wetlands 
prevented a public harm that would arise from the alteration of the 
natural character of the wetland property and therefore did not effect 
a taking); Orion Corp. v. Washington State. 747 P.2d 1062, 1081 
(Wash. 1987), cert. denied. 486 U.S. 1022 (1988) (ruling that state and 
local regulation of tidelands did not give rise to a taking, stating "no 
compensable taking can occur as long as regulations substantially serve 
the legitimate public purpose of prohibiting uses of property injurious 
to the public interest in health, the environment, or the fiscal integrity 
of the community"). The Supreme Court’s decision in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), will make it more 




The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has recognized that the proper 
measure of just compensation for the taking of property is the fair 
market value of the property at the time of the taking. See Loveladies 
Harbor II. 21 Cl. Ct. at 160 (awarding $2,658,000 plus interest for the 
taking of 12.5 acres of land). Successful plaintiffs should also receive 
interest on that amount from the time of the taking. Id.; see also 
Bowles v. United States. No. 303-88L, 1994 WL 102117, at *15 (Fed. 
Cl. Mar. 24, 1994) (compound interest awarded to private landowner 
for taking of residential property); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United 
States, 1994 WL 45855 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 10, 1994) (finding taking of 
commercial property and awarding compound interest to compensate 
for significant delay).
In determining the fair market value of property taken as a result of 
the Corps’ denial of a Section 404 application, the property is to be 
valued without regard to the Section 404 restrictions that gave rise to 
the takings claim. See Loveladies Harbor II, 21 Cl. Ct. at 156.
-14-
2. Attorneys’ Fees
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims has ruled that successful plaintiffs 
in an inverse condemnation suit against the United States based on a 
denial of a Section 404 permit are entitled to an award of attorneys’ 
fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 4654. See, e.g., Bowles. No. 303-88L, 
1994 WL 102117, at *15; Loveladies Harbor II. 21 Cl. Ct. at 161.
The United States government agreed to pay $100,000 in litigation 
expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 4654 as part of a settlement of a 
takings claim arising from a Section 404 permit denial. Beure’-Co. v. 
United States, No. 129-86L (Judgment) (Cl. Ct. Dec. 16, 1991).
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DECIDED: May 24 , 1994
Before ARCHER, Chief Judge,* and RICH, NIES, NEWMAN, MAYER, MICHEL, 
PLAGER, LOURIE, CLEVENGER, RADER, and SCHALL, Circuit Judges.
PLAGER, Circuit Judge.
This case first came before the court as a regulatory takings 
case. The United States Government (Government) appealed from the 
merits of a decision of the Court of Federal Claims, which had 
granted monetary relief to a property owner, Loveladies Harbor, 
Inc. and Loveladies Harbor, Unit D, Inc. (collectively, 
Loveladies), as a consequence of the Government's denial of a 
wetlands development permit. In light of an intervening decision 
by this court on an unrelated matter, the Government moved to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The court has taken the 
jurisdictional dispute in banc. We hold that this court has
*Judge Archer assumed the position of Chief Judge on March
18, 1994.
Based on our decision in UNR, but prior to the decision of the 
Supreme Court in UNR/Keene, the Government moved in this court to 
vacate the judgment in favor of Loveladies. The Government in its 
motion argued that UNR compelled the conclusion that, since the 
suit in the Court of Federal Claims had been filed while the appeal 
in the earlier district court suit was still pending, § 1500 bars 
the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims over the cause.
In opposition to the Government's motion, Loveladies argued 
that UNR did not compel that conclusion for several reasons, 
including that the same claims were not involved and that 
United States, 135 Ct. Cl. 647 (1956) and like cases, distinguishing 
claims on the basis of the relief sought, supported jurisdiction.
Because of the importance of the issue, and the fact that 
other pending cases raise the same issue,8 this court, sitting in 
banc, by order dated September 28, 1993, called for briefs and
subsequently heard oral argument regarding the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Federal Claims, and by derivation the jurisdiction of this 
court, over this matter. After considering the briefs and
Without suggesting any view of the merits of the 
Government's claim in any particular case, we note that similar 
motions have been filed by the Government in a number of other 
cases now before the Court of Federal Claims. See, e.g., Rybachek v.
United States, No. 379-89L; Whitney Benefits United States, No. 499- 
83C; and Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma United States, No. 242- 
87L; State of Utah v. United States, No. 91-1428L; State of Alaska United 
States, No. 92-314L. In addition, the Court of Federal Claims has 
granted a number of such motions, which are now before this court 
on appeal. See Southern Ute Indian Tribe United States, No. 93-5019; 
Dico, Inc. v. United States, No. 93-5124; Cascade Development Co., Inc., v. 
United States, No. 83-5087.
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arguments of the parties, and those of the several amic,9 we 
conclude that the Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction over the 
cause, and the appeal on the merits of that court's decision is 




As a preliminary matter, we observe that our decision in 
does not constrain our decision today. Appellants in UNR, asbestos 
manufacturers, filed suit against the United States in the district 
court seeking money damages based on tort claims. They then filed 
in the Court of Federal Claims for money damages based on certain 
contracts they had with the Government. Both suits arose out of 
the same underlying events. Appellants challenged the long­
standing rule that suits involving the same operative facts and 
seeking the same relief were the same "claims" for purposes of 
§ 1500, even if based on different legal theories. British
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 89 Ct. cl. 438 (1939) (
American) .
Appellants in UNR raised another issue. Appellants' 
contractual claims had been filed, but not acted upon, when their 
district court claims were dismissed. Thus, when the Government
Briefs amicus curiae were filed by: Cascade Development 
Company; Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma; Dico, Inc.; National 
Association of Home Builders; Pacific Legal Foundation; Southern 
Ute Indian Tribe; the States of Utah and Alaska; and Whitney 
Benefits, Inc.
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moved to dismiss their claims in the Court of Federal Claims 
pursuant to § 1500, appellants had no pending claims. Appellants 
hence argued that jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims was 
barred only if a claim was pending when the Government moved to 
dismiss under § 1500. In U N R ,this court rejected both of 
appellants' contentions.
The Supreme Court on certiorari agreed. In UNR/Keene, the
Supreme Court held that § 1500 precluded the Court of Federal
Claims from exercising jurisdiction over the manufacturers' 
contract-based claims against the United States, because the 
manufacturers' tort claims were still pending in district court 
when suit in the Court of Federal Claims was filed. The question 
of whether another claim is "pending" for purposes of § 1500 is 
determined at the time at which the suit in the Court of Federal 
Claims is filed, not the time at which the Government moves to 
dismiss the action.
When this court decided UNR, we chose "to revisit the 
jurisprudence encumbering this statute." Id., 962 F.2d at 1021. 
In so doing, we declared "overruled" a number of cases, including 
Casman. UNR, 962 F.2d at 1022 n.3. The Supreme Court took
exception to our efforts. "Because the issue is not presented on 
the facts of this case, we need not decide whether two actions 
based on the same operative facts, but seeking completely different 
relief, would implicate § 1500." UNR/Keene, 113 S. Ct. at 2043 n.6 
(citing Casaan and a similar case, Boston Five Cents Savings , FSB v. 
United States, 864 F.2d 137 (Fed. cir. 1988) . At a
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later point in its UNR/Keene opinion the Supreme Court said: "In 
applying § 1500 to the facts of this case, we find it unnecessary 
to consider, much less repudiate, the 'judicially created 
exceptions' to § 1500 found in Tecon Engineers, Casman, and Boston 
Five." UNR/Keene, 113 S. Ct. at 2044 (quoting from and citing to 
this court's UNR opinion.)10
As the Supreme Court has reminded us, anything we said in UNR 
regarding the legal import of cases whose factual bases were not 
properly before us was mere dictum, and therefore we will not 
accord it stare decisis effect. The Government can draw no comfort 
in this case from the holding of UNR, as affirmed in UNR/Keene. The 
issue the Government raises, and which is now properly before us 
on the facts of this case, is whether § 1500 denies jurisdiction 
to the Court of Federal Claims if, at the time a complaint for 
money damages is filed, there is a pending action in another court 
that seeks distinctly different relief. Our precedent, Casman and 
cases like it, tells us the answer is no. As we are unwilling to 
give stare decisis effect to a matter that we did not fully consider 
and that was not before us in the prior case, we do not consider 
today's case as a 'resurrection' of Casman (see dissent, 57 op. at 
5) , but as an opportunity for the Government to persuade us why we 
should abandon Casman.
' Tecon Eng'rs, Inc. v. United States, 343 F.2d 943 (Ct. Cl. 
1965) held that a later-filed action in another court does not oust 
the Court of Claims of jurisdiction over an earlier-filed 
complaint. That situation was not before this court in UNR.
91-5050 7
II.
The precise issue in this case is the meaning of the term 
"claims" as it is used in § 1500, which states that the Court of 
Federal Claims shall not have jurisdiction "of claims for or in 
respect to which the plaintiff . . . has pending in any other court 
any suit or process against the United States . . ." (Emphasis 
added.) Specifically, the question is whether the "claims" which 
Loveladies brought to the Court of Federal Claims are the same as 
the "claims" which Loveladies had already sued upon in the district 
court. If the claims are the same, the jurisdiction of the Court 
of Federal Claims over the same claims, still pending before the 
district court when the second suit was filed, was barred by 
§ 1500. If the claims are distinctly different, Loveladies are 
excused from the jurisdictional dance required by § 1500.
Deciding if the claims are the same or distinctly different 
"requires a comparison between the claims raised in the Court of 
Federal Claims and in the other lawsuit." 113 S. Ct. at 
2041. It also requires a definition of "claims" that the statute 
does not provide. As the Supreme Court put it, "The exact nature 
of the things to be compared is not illuminated, however, by the 
awkward formulation of § 1500." Id.
The legislative history of § 1500 is fairly straightforward, 
and was ably recounted in this court's opinion in 962 F.2d at 
1017-19, and more briefly by the Supreme Court in UNR/Keene, 113 
S. ct. 2039-40. See also David Schwartz, Section 1500 of the Judicial 
Code and Duplicate Suits Against the Government and Its Agents, 55 Geo. L.J.
91-5050 8
573, 574-80 (1967). Like the statute, the legislative history does 
not teach how to identify claims that are the same for the purposes 
of § 1500.
The meaning and scope of the term, then, has been left to 
caselaw development. This court recently reviewed the question in 
Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 855 F.2d 1556 (Fed. cir. 1988), 
cert, denied, 489 U.s. 1066 (1989) (John-Mavile). We reaffirmed the 
rule that it is 'operative facts' and not legal theories by which 
claims may be distinguished under § 1500 when the same relief —  
money damages —  is sought.11 Johns-Manville filed indemnification 
claims in district courts against the Government, based on amounts 
it had paid for defense and settlement of suits for injuries 
allegedly due to exposure to asbestos products it had sold to the 
Government.12 Jurisdiction in the district court was based on the 
Federal Tort Claims Act. While these suits were pending, Johns- 
Manville filed three suits in the Court of Federal Claims seeking 
indemnification from the Government for essentially the same 
losses, but this time on claims of breach of implied warranty, duty 
to reveal superior knowledge, and mutual mistake —  all contract 
based claims.
The Court of Federal Claims dismissed plaintiff's suit 
pursuant to § 1500. We affirmed, holding that "Claims are the same
11 See also UNR, 962 F.2d at 1024, "We decline to disturb 
either this precedent or Johns-Manville." "This precedent" referred 
to British Aaerican and Los Angeles Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. United 
States, 152 F. Supp. 236 (Ct. Cl. 1957).
12 There were also third-party complaints filed in the 
Eastern District of Virginia. Johns-Manville, 855 F.2d at 1558.
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where they arise from the same operative facts even if the 
operative facts support different legal theories which cannot all 
be brought in one court." Johns-Manvile, 855 F.2d at 1567. The 
court distinguished the situation before it, one in which the 
relief sought from both courts is money but under different legal 
theories, from one in which "a different type of relief is sought 
in the district court (equitable) from that sought in the Court of 
Claims (money)." Id. at 1566 (citing Casman). As the court
observed, "the legislative history and the cases indicate section 
1500 was enacted for the benefit of the government and was intended 
to force an election where both forums could grant the same relief, 
arising from the same operative facts." Johns-Manville, 855 F.2d at 
1564.
Viewing claims as related to the nature of the relief sought 
is unremarkable.13 And using differing relief as a characteristic 
for distinguishing claims was especially appropriate here, because 
the Court of Federal Claims and its predecessors have been courts 
with limited authority to grant relief. These courts could not 
grant the kinds of general equitable relief the district courts 
could, even in cases over which they otherwise have had subject- 
matter jurisdiction. Although the powers of the Court of Federal 
Claims have been increased in recent years, so that in some 
instances it can grant complete relief in cases over which it has
"What is a claim against the United States is well 
understood. It is a right to demand money from the United States." 
Hobbs v. Mclean, 117 u.S. 567, 575 (1885). See also Blacks's Law
Dictionary 247 (6th ed. 1990), defining claim as, inter alia, a 
"[d]emand for money or property as of right."
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subject matter jurisdiction, the Court of Federal Claims remains 
a court with limited remedial powers.14
The Casaan case cited in Johns-Manville arose when a government 
employee sued in district court for reinstatement to his position 
with the Government, and while that suit was pending, sued in the 
Court of Claims for back pay denied him as a result of the 
allegedly unlawful removal.15 When the Government moved to dismiss 
under § 1500 the monetary claim in the Court of Claims, that court 
denied the motion. The court held that the two suits alleged 
different "claims" —  although the two suits involved the same 
conflict between the same parties, the claims were distinguished 
by the different form of relief each sought.16
This court and its predecessor, although sometimes referring 
to the Casaan rule as an "exception" to § 1500, see, e.g., Johns- 
Manville at 1566, have consistently applied this principle to 
distinguish claims. See, e.g. Truckee Carson Irrigation District v. United
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1992) (granting 
Court of Federal Claims power to render judgment in nonmonetary 
disputes arising under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978).
15 Under the jurisdictional rules then in effect, the 
district court could not grant the monetary damages alleged, and 
the Court of Claims did not have authority to order reinstatement. 
Now, under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1992), the Court of 
Federal Claims can order reinstatement.
16 "The claim in this case and the relief sought in the 
district court are entirely different. The claim of plaintiff for 
back pay is one that falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of 
this court, and there is no other court which plaintiff might 
elect. On the other hand, the Court of Claims is without 
jurisdiction to restore plaintiff to his position." Casaan, 135 
Ct. Cl. at 649-50 (citations omitted). The suit in the Court of 
Claims was allowed to continue.
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States, 223 ct. Cl. 684 (1980); Boston Five, 864 F.2d 137 (Fed. cir. 
1988). See also Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 
1981) (takings claim was filed and prosecuted in Court of Claims 
during the pendency of a challenge in district court to the 
validity of the Corps' denial of a dredge and fill permit; the 
issue of whether jurisdiction was barred by § 1500 was not 
addressed); Webb v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 650 (1990) (relief used 
to distinguish a claim presented to the then Claims Court from a 
claim in district court).
The description of the Casaan rule as an "exception" to § 1500 
is inapt. Courts cannot create exceptions to jurisdictional grants 
not expressed in the statute. Corona Coal Co. v. United States, 263 
U.S. 537 (1924). Casaan and its progeny reflect a carefully 
considered interpretation of the statutory term "claims," a term 
undefined in the statute and subject to conflicting views as to its 
meaning.
Similarly, the "operative facts" rule applied in 
was an interpretation of the term "claims," and was consistent with 
the Court of Claims decision in British American, which had held that 
two claims were not necessarily different simply because they were 
based on different legal theories. In British American, the
plaintiff, acting under federal regulations and executive orders, 
surrendered gold bullion to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
The plaintiff brought suit against the Government in district court 
under a tort theory, and in the Court of Claims under a contractual 
theory. In both courts plaintiff sought a money judgment. The
91-5050 12
Court of Claims held that § 1500 barred the claim before it. It 
made no difference that the two suits were based upon different 
legal theories; the plaintiff had only one claim for money based 
on the same set of facts.
Courts have also long followed the principle of British 
American.17 See e.g. Los Angeles Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. United States,
152 F. Supp. 236 (Ct. Cl. 1957); Hill v. United States, 8 Cl. ct. 382 
(1985); Bennally v. United States, 14 Cl. ct. 8 (1987); JohnsMavile,
855 F. 2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1988); UNR, 962 F.2d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 
1992); UNR/Keene, 113 S. Ct. 2035, 2043 (1993) ("The decision in
British American Tobacco strikes us, moreover, as a sensible reading 
of the statute . . .").
Thus we have consistently tested claims against both the 
principle established in Casman and that established in British 
American. Taken together, these tests produce a working definition 
of "claims" for the purpose of applying § 1500. For the Court of 
Federal Claims to be precluded from hearing a claim under § 1500, 
the claim pending in another court must arise from the same operative 
facts, and must seek the same relief. We know of no case arising from 
the same operative facts in which § 1500 has been held to bar
17 Despite its lineage, it can be argued that there is a 
basic epistemological difficulty with the notion of legally 
operative facts independent of a legal theory. Insofar as a fact 
is 'operative' —  i.e., relevant to a judicially imposed remedy - 
- it is necessarily associated with an underlying legal theory, 
that is, the cause of action. For example, without legal 
underpinning, words in a contract are no different from casual 
correspondence. Because it is unnecessary for our decision in this 
case, we need not further refine the meaning of 'operative facts.'
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jurisdiction over a claim praying for relief distinctly different 
from that sought in a pending proceeding.18
III.
The Government presents several arguments why this case should 
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Government argues first 
that Loveladies' APA challenge to the validity of the permit denial 
filed in district court, and their suit in the Court of Federal 
Claims for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment, are in 
reality one claim, arising from the same operative facts, and that 
under the law that alone is enough to bar jurisdiction under 
§ 1500. As our precedents establish, and as we explained above, 
a showing that the two claims arose from the same 'operative facts' 
is necessary, but not sufficient, to preclude the Court of Federal 
Claims from hearing a case. To come within the proscription of 
§ 1500, the claims must also seek the same relief. Each of 
Loveladies' two suits prays for distinctly different relief. The 
Government's argument that § 1500 precludes the Court of Federal 
Claims from hearing Loveladies' takings claim on the ground of 
operative facts alone is, under the law, without merit.19
Our independent search has turned up no such case. At 
oral argument counsel for both parties were asked if they knew of 
any such case, and both answered in the negative.
19 Question 3 of the court's Order of September 28, 1993, 
asked in part, "If some but not all of the operative facts are the 
same, does Johns-Mavile require that the § 1500 bar apply?" In 
view of our disposition of the case, that question is not before 
us for decision.
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The Government then argues that we should overturn long­
standing precedent and adopt new law, a new definition of "claims." 
The Government argues that it should be enough to preclude the 
Court of Federal Claims from hearing a claim if another claim, 
arising from the same operative facts, is pending in another court, 
regardless of the type of relief sought. Under this theory, if we 
accept, as we have done arguendo, that Loveladies' two suits arise 
from the same operative facts,20 then § 1500 denies jurisdiction to 
the Court of Federal Claims. The Government makes essentially two 
arguments in support of a new understanding of § 1500.
First, the Government reads Corona Coal Co. United States, 263 
U.S. 537 (1924), to hold "the Supreme Court explicitly rejected 
the concept that Section 154 (the predecessor of § 1500] should 
be made subject to a hardship exception." True enough, and 
irrelevant. In Corona Coal, the petitioner argued that even though 
there was a pending suit in district court seeking the same relief 
based on the same facts as those in the Court of Claims suit, the 
statutory bar should not apply because the imminent running of the 
statute of limitations forced petitioner to file. The Supreme 
Court responded: "But the words of the statute are plain, with 
nothing in the context to make their meaning doubtful? no room is 
left for construction, and we are not at liberty to add an 
exception in order to remove apparent hardship in particular 
cases." Id. at 540.
20 See note 17 supra.
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The case before us is not a matter in which a court-created 
exception to an otherwise plain piece of legislation is at issue. 
As we noted earlier, Casman did not create an "exception” to the 
rule of § 1500, any more than British did. In each case, 
this court or its predecessor was called upon to specify the 
meaning of an ill-defined and multivalent term, "claims," in a 
particular factual context. Casman and British American establish two 
applicable principles —  (i) identity of relief requested, and (ii) 
identity of operative facts —  with which to test the identity of 
claims. As we have seen, this court has consistently adhered to 
those principles.
The Government's second argument for adopting its 
understanding of § 1500 is that, if we do not adopt the 
Government's view, we will return the law to the confused state it 
was in before our opinion in UNR, the opinion in which, the 
Government claims, we eliminated much prior case law interpreting 
§ 1500 and thereby rectified the jurisprudence surrounding the 
statute. There are three problems with this argument. First, as 
discussed above, our opinion in UNR did not make all the supposedly 
crooked ways surrounding § 1500 straight. The common law does not 
work like that; that is its genius. See South Corp. v. United States, 
690 F.2d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1982) ("resolution of conflict, a 
major element in this court's mission, requires not a one-shot 
selection but a careful, considered, cautious, and contemplative 
approach.").
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Second, the Government introduces no evidence of the alleged 
confusion presumably surrounding § 1500. We have not been shown 
the existence of a serious shortcoming in the case law causing 
irremediable difficulty for litigants. The principles of 
and British American are not that difficult to comprehend or apply. 
Third, whatever residue of confusion may exist in the Government's 
mind on this issue, or in the minds of others, our opinion today 
should dispel.
The Government finally argues that, even if § 1500 does not 
bar the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims when different 
relief is sought, Loveladies in fact was not seeking relief 
different from that sought in the district court. The Government 
bases this argument on a comparison of the complaints filed in 
those courts. The pleadings are in some respects similar 
(apparently parts were copied one from the other), and both ask the 
court to "declare" certain conclusions. Therefore, argues the 
Government, this case is different from Casman in that Loveladies 
sought the same declaratory relief in both courts. The dissent 
agrees with the Government. We do not.
The district court complaint alleges jurisdiction under both 
the Fifth Amendment and the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 
and under § 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 
(33 U.S.C. § 1344), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 
§ 554), and the general grant to the district courts of 
jurisdiction over federal questions, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. After 
reciting allegations as to all counts, the complaint sets forth
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eight numbered counts. The gravamen of the First Count is the
allegation that "defendant has violated the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution by taking plaintiffs' private property
for public use without compensation." The remaining counts allege
various wrongs in the regulatory authority and practices of the
Corps as they relate to the Loveladies case. The complaint closes
with a prayer that asks the court for relief, including:
2. Declaring that the action of the defendant in denying 
the permit application of plaintiffs constitutes a taking 
of property in violation of plaintiffs' rights under the 
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution;
• • • •
4. Declaring that the regulations relied upon ... are 
unconstitutional [as beyond the scope of the Commerce 
Clause];
• • • •
5. Declaring that the regulations relied upon ... are 
ultra vires . . .
and concludes with the usual "granting such other relief . . . "
prayer.
The complaint in the Court of Claims is similar, but shorter. 
The jurisdictional allegations are limited to the Fifth Amendment, 
and to § 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act21 and 28 
U.S.C. § 1494, the Tucker Act. There are only two counts. The 
first is a repeat, somewhat expanded, of the first count of the 
district court complaint. The second count repeats some of the 
allegations about the arbitrary nature of the Corps' decision. The 
prayer again, inter alia, includes a request for relief that the 
court declare that the action of the defendant in denying the
21 Both the district court and Court of Claims complaints 
contain the same typographical error -- they refer to the Federal 
Water Pollution Contract Act.
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permit application of plaintiffs constitutes a taking of property 
in violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.
It is important to note that the prayer in the Court of Claims 
complaint contained an express request for damages. Significantly, 
that request was missing from the complaint in the district court. 
Furthermore, despite asking that the court 'declare' relief, 
neither complaint, in the jurisdictional allegations or elsewhere, 
refers or cites to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 
Nor has the Government pointed to anything that suggests the 
proceedings were conducted under that Act, or in accordance with 
the rules that govern such proceedings.22 In each suit, the full 
relief requested could have been granted by, in the case of the 
district court suit, a mandatory injunction, and in the case of the 
Court of Federal Claims suit, a decree for money damages, without 
either court "declaring” anything. The use of the term "declaring" 
in the prayers for relief was clearly intended to convey a request 
different from a formal declaration under the Declaratory Judgment 
Act.
The Government further argues that the presence of an 
allegation of a taking in the two complaints means that the claims 
in the district court suit were the same claims as those in the 
Court of Federal Claims suit, since Loveladies sought in the 
district court a declaration of taking and thus implicitly the
2 See Fed. R. civ. P. 57.
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But themonetary relief that would accompany the declaration.23 
Government itself destroyed the core of that argument in its answer 
to that complaint. In the district court, the Government stated 
as its First Separate Defense: "This Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the Complaint's allegations of a taking of 
property." The district court agreed with the Government's view 
that Count I was without legal significance as far as a taking and 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment were concerned. While 
granting judgment in favor of the Government on all other counts, 
that court dismissed Count I without prejudice to the rights of 
plaintiffs to pursue the takings allegations in the Court of 
Federal Claims.24 The prayer for a "declaration" of a taking, for 
which the First Count was the predicate, thus was equally without 
legal significance.
By contrast, in the complaint in the Court of Federal Claims 
Loveladies clearly alleged that a taking had occured, and that just 
compensation was due them. As we have often noted, the Tucker Act, 
which was cited by Loveladies as their jurisdictional base, 
provides jurisdiction for damage suits against the United States 
Government, but a recovery against the Government requires a 
substantive right created by some money-mandating constitutional *§
23 We note in passing that the allegations of a taking, 
found in both complaints, could be viewed as reflecting the legal 
theory assumed to underlie the factual allegations. Since
differing legal theories do not define differing claims under
§ 1500, there seems no logical reason to suppose that overlapping 
legal theories (see dissent, Slip op. at 9) necessarily define the 
same claims.
24 The Government, as well as Loveladies, consented to the
dismissal.
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provision, statute or regulation that has been violated, or an 
express or implied contract with the United States. See,
United States v. Conly, 716 F.2d 882, 885 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (in banc), 
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1065 (1984). That Loveladies sought a clear 
finding or "declaration" of their rights under the Fifth Amendment 
as the money-mandating source of their entitlement to recovery 
seems hardly surprising.
In sum, reading the two complaints in light of the legal and 
factual circumstances in which they were drawn leaves little doubt 
what was intended by the prayers for relief contained in them. At 
the time Loveladies filed their complaint in the district court 
seeking invalidation of the Government's action, they may not have 
foreseen the possible complications that might arise if they later 
sought monetary relief in the Court of Federal Claims. If they 
had, perhaps they might have framed their pleadings with more 
precision. Be that as it may, the claims in the two courts are for 
distinctly different and not the same or even overlapping relief - 
- this case presents the straightforward issue of plaintiffs "who 
seek distinctly different types of relief in the two courts." 
UNR/Keene, 113 S. ct. at 2044-45.25
25 The dissent invokes the overruling of Brown v. United States, 
358 F.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1966), by this court in and the Supreme 
Court's agreement in UNR/Keene as somehow relevant to the overlapping 
relief issue. But Brown was a case in which, despite § 1500, the 
Court of Claims had allowed a suit to proceed that was filed in 
that court while a district court action seeking the same relief 
was pending. The reasoning in Brown was in direct conflict with 
this court's and the Supreme Court's view of § 1500 as applied to 
such cases, and obviously was not good law. The facts of Brown 
remove it from any application to the issues in this case.
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IV.
The result we reach on the Government's motion is further 
supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania Railroad Co. 
v. United States, 363 U.S. 202 (1960). In that case the Supreme Court 
confronted the basic issue here: the interplay of two legally 
recognized and protected rights, which, because of the statutory 
jurisdictional structure, are thrown into apparent conflict. The 
problem arose there, as it does here, when a federal government 
agency exercised its regulatory power in a manner that raises 
questions both of the validity of the exercise and, if valid, the 
economic consequences of the exercise.
In Pennsylvania Railroad, war conditions had prevented the 
Government's planned exportation of certain raw materials to Great 
Britain. The Pennsylvania Railroad charged the Government the 
higher 'domestic' rate for transport of the materials (the railroad 
charged less for transport of goods for export). The Government 
paid the higher domestic rate, but then set-off the amount of the 
price difference from other obligations it owed to the railroad. 
The railroad brought suit in the Court of Claims to recover the 
amount so deducted. Id. at 203.
The Court of Claims proceedings initially were suspended while 
the railroad and the Government disputed before the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) the correctness under governing 
regulations of the rates, an issue which was under ICC 
jurisdiction. The railroad disagreed with part of the ICC's 
determination, and appealed to the District Court as the statute
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provided, seeking to set aside the ICC order. Plaintiff railroad 
requested that the Court of Claims continue to stay its proceedings 
pending the District Court ruling on the validity of the ICC 
determination. The Court of Claims declined to do so. Id. at 203-
04.26
The Supreme Court held that this was error:
[J ]urisdiction [to review the ICC determination] is vested 
exclusively in the District Courts. . . .  It necessarily 
follows, of course, that since the Railroad had a right to have 
the Commission's order reviewed, and only the District Court had 
the jurisdiction to review it, the Court of was under a duty
to stay its proceedings pending this review.
Id. at 205-06 (emphasis added).
The plaintiff in Pennsylvania Railroad had a right to have the
Commission's order reviewed because it determined certain rights
and obligations which had significant legal consequences for its
dispute with the Government. Plaintiffs such as Loveladies, too,
have a right to have the Corps' permit denial reviewed, without
being placed in the position of having to give up a substantial
legal right protected by the Takings Clause of the Constitution.
See also Aulston v. United States, 823 F.2d 510, 514 (Fed. cir. 1987)
(Claims Court ordered to "hold appellants' taking claim on its
docket in suspension for such time as is reasonably necessary for
26 The Government sought also to dismiss the Court of Claims
action, citing § 1500. The Court of Claims denied the motion, and 
the Supreme Court specifically noted that the issue was not
challenged on appeal. Id. at 204. If jurisdiction as defined by
§ 1500 were at issue, the Supreme Court's indifference to the 
question of its jurisdiction would be puzzling since it is a basic 
principle that courts must attend to their jurisdiction even if the 
parties do not. Louisville & Nat'l R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 
152 (1908); UNR, 962 F.2d at 1022.
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appellants to challenge the [agency] decision in a district court, 
and if successful there, to return promptly to the Claims Court.").
The plaintiff in Pennsylvania Railroad, after filing in the 
Claims Court, was confronted with the necessity of litigating the 
regulatory issue in another court. In the case before us, 
plaintiffs filed the APA action in the district court first, and 
then filed the takings claim in the Court of Federal Claims. In 
a takings case this is entirely logical —  if the validity of the 
regulatory imposition is to be challenged, it makes sense to pursue 
the validity question first so as to determine the necessity for 
prosecuting the takings claim. The risk of course is that too long 
a time may be required for initiation of a suit, discovery and 
other pretrial activities, and decisions at both trial and 
appellate levels. It may not always be possible because of the 
statute of limitations for a plaintiff to wait for the regulatory 
challenge case to be finally concluded before filing in the Court 
of Federal Claims.27
Litigation can serve public interests as well as the 
particular interests of the parties. The nation is served by 
private litigation which accomplishes public ends, for example, by 
checking the power of the Government through suits brought under 
the APA or under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Because this nation relies in significant degree on litigation to 
control the excesses to which Government may from time to time be 
prone, it would not be sound policy to force plaintiffs to forego
28 U.S.C. § 2501 (Supp. IV 1992) sets the bar at 6 years.
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monetary claims in order to challenge the validity of Government 
action, or to preclude challenges to the validity of Government 
action in order to protect a Constitutional claim for compensation. 
Section 1500 was enacted to preclude duplicate cotton claims —  
claims for money damages —  at a time when res judicata principles 
did not provide the Government with protection against such 
"duplicative lawsuits." UNR/Keene, 113 S. Ct. at 2039. Whatever 
viability remains in § 1500, absent a clear expression of 
Congressional intent we ought not extend the statute to allow the 
Government to foreclose non-duplicative suits, and to deny remedies 
the Constitution and statutes otherwise provide.
CONCLUSION
The motion of the Government that the judgment of the Court 
of Federal Claims be vacated and the complaint dismissed is denied. 
The case is returned to the panel for decision on the merits.
MOTION DENIED.
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MAYER, Circuit Judge, with whom NIES* and RADER, Circuit Judges, 
join, dissenting.
♦
Because I see no reason to reconsider our recent in banc 
decision in UNR v. United States. 962 F.2d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 1992),
aff'd sub nom. Keene Coro, v. United States. 508 U.S. __, 113
S. Ct. 2035 (1993), I dissent.
I.
A court is free to reverse itself when it sits in banc, of 
course, but "any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis 
demands special justification," which is missing from today's 
undertaking. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union. 491 U.S. 164, 172 
(1989) (citation omitted)). This is especially so "in the area of 
statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of
* Circuit Judge Nies vacated the position of Chief Judge 
on March 17, 1994.
constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, 
and Congress remains free to alter what we have done." Id.
This case revolves around the authority of the Court of 
Federal Claims to hear petitioners who have a suit against the 
government relating to the same claims pending in another court. 
28 U.S.C. § 1500 (Supp. IV 1992).1 Like all federal courts, the 
Court of Federal Claims has limited jurisdiction, with a range of 
authority extending only so far as Congress, by statute, permits; 
the statutes that define the court's jurisdiction must be strictly 
construed. Keene, 113 S. Ct. at 2040. Though this may work
injustice in a particular case, we cannot, in the interest of 
justice or equity, presume to expand jurisdiction beyond these 
narrow bounds. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 
U.S. 800, 818 (1988).
In UNR we addressed the meaning of "claim" under section 1500. 
962 F.2d at 1023. The claims heard by the Court of Federal Claims 
generally involve requests for monetary relief. But it does not 
follow that only suits brought in other courts for money damages 
can give rise to section 1500's jurisdictional bar. Section 1500 
divests the Court of Federal Claims of jurisdiction over such a 
claim where the plaintiff has a suit for the claim pending in 
another court or where the one in the Court of Federal Claims
1 The United States Court of Federal Claims shall 
not have jurisdiction of any claims for or in 
respect to which the plaintiff or his assignee 
has pending in any other court any suit or 
process against the United States . . . .
Id.
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relates to -—  is "in respect to" —  another suit. The 
jurisdictional question raised by section 1500 is thus not simply 
whether the claims are the "same," but whether they are 
sufficiently related to invoke the bar. In UNR. the in banc court 
reaffirmed that the answer lies in a comparison of the operative 
facts from which the suits arise. "[C]orrectly construed, section 
1500 applies to all claims on whatever theories that 'arise from 
the same operative facts.'" 962 F.2d at 1023 (citation omitted).
UNR was "a comprehensive effort to set out the proper 
interpretation of a jurisdictional statute, a matter that does not 
require a pointed dispute between parties. Courts are obliged to 
resolve jurisdictional questions on their own even if parties do 
not raise them. In the course of this interpretive effort, if 
prior cases are seen as inconsistent, it is incumbent on the court 
to acknowledge their nonviability." 962 F.2d at 1023. At issue 
were the indemnification claims of corporations who manufactured 
and supplied asbestos products in the course of contract work for 
the government. When workers filed personal injury suits against 
the corporations arising from exposure to their products, the 
defendants sought indemnification from the government in district 
court, alleging tort theories, and in the Court of Federal Claims 
on contractual theories.
We confirmed the trial court's dismissal of the claims, 
holding that section 1500 applied regardless of which action was 
first filed, and that "claim", as it appears in the statute, refers 
not to the legal theory of the suit but to the operative facts
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supporting the petitioners' various actions. Thus, we held that 
the petitioners' claims in the Court of Federal Claims were claims 
for or in respect to which they had suits pending in the district 
court, even though the former were based on contractual theories 
of recovery and the latter on tort theories, because they arose 
from the same personal injuries. Id. at 1023.
We also considered the exception to this rule set out in 
Casman v. United States. 135 Ct. Cl. 647 (1956), which excused 
adherence to section 1500 where the claims in question seek 
different forms of relief. We all knew a factual predicate for a 
Casman exception was not before us in UNR. but during the course 
of our consideration of the statute, it was plain that we could not 
square that and like cases with the clear meaning of the 
jurisdictional statute. That statute, as a whole, was before us 
in UNR; there is no requirement that a factual predicate underlay 
every jot and tittle of it before a court can explain what it 
means.
The history of section 1500 is replete with instances where 
courts sought to temper perceived inequity by inventing exceptions 
to the rule. See 962 F.2d at 1020. In Casman. the injustice was 
thought to arise because no court was able to simultaneously grant 
complete relief to the petitioner: he sought restoration to his 
position, available only in the district court, and back pay, which 
he could only recover in the Court of Claims. Casman held section 
1500 inapplicable because it was thought unfair to force the 
plaintiff to choose between the two courts. 135 Ct. Cl. at 650.
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But it is axiomatic that courts cannot extend their 
jurisdiction in the interest of equity. Christianson. 486 U.S. at 
818. Faced with a jurisdictional statute riddled with judicially 
created loopholes, in UNR we concluded that section 1500 should be 
applied according to its plain words, and that instrumental to such 
application was a single, coherent definition of the word "claim" 
as referring only to the facts underlying the petitioner's action 
against the government. This construction is consistent with 
precedent stretching back sixty years or more. UNR. 962 F.2d at 
1023; Johns-Manville Coro, v. United States. 855 F.2d 1556, 1563 
(Fed. Cir. 1988)? British American Tobacco Co. v. United States. 
89 Ct. Cl. 438, 440 (1939).2 We overruled Casman because it was in 
conflict with this interpretation.
The Supreme Court agreed that "the comparison of the two cases 
for purposes of possible dismissal would turn on whether the 
plaintiff's other suit was based on substantially the same 
operative facts as the Court of Claims action, at least if there 
was some overlap in the relief requested." 113 S. Ct. at 2042. 
Finding that the Casman exception was not implicated by the facts 
of the case before it, the Court chose not to decide whether two 
actions seeking different relief would require dismissal under the
2 The court tells us that we have always applied section 
1500 pursuant to a two pronged test, operative facts and relief 
requested. But there is no evidence of this before the Casman 
departure in 1956, a period of some 88 years after the statute was 
enacted. We did not notice this phenomenon in our UNR exercise, 
and the Supreme Court apparently missed it in Keene. as well. See 
113 S. Ct. at 2043.
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statute. Id. at 2043 n.6. The Court said nothing by way of 
disapproval of our ruling on Casman. But nine of the ten judges 
hearing that case here said that Casman was unsound and 
inconsistent with section 1500. One wonders why six of them now 
think otherwise.
Be that as it may, now, only one year later, the court 
resurrects Casman, scrambling once more down the path of judicial 
revision of the statute. Normally, "[i]n cases where statutory 
precedents have been overruled, the primary reason for the Court's 
shift in position has been the intervening development of the law, 
through either the growth of judicial doctrine or further action 
taken by Congress." Patterson. 491 U.S. at 173. To my knowledge, 
no laws have changed in the short time since we decided UNR. 
Departing from stare decisis demands more than cursory distinctions 
—  at the very least, one would expect reversal of our so recent 
in banc precedent to be supported by some compelling reason.
"[A] traditional justification for overruling a prior case is 
that a precedent may be a positive detriment to coherence and 
consistency in the law . . . ." Id. This was the justification 
which supported the overruling of Casman in UNR. We said there 
that section 1500, which had become a judicial embarrassment, a 
monument to cynicism, "is now so riddled with unsupportable 
loopholes that it has lost its predictability and people cannot 
rely on it to order their affairs." 962 F.2d at 1021. In fact, 
only the other day we unanimously agreed that "fail[ure] to adhere 
to a statutory mandate over an extended period of time does not
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justify . . . continuing to do so." In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 
1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (in banc).
I agree that plaintiffs should have access to the full range 
of remedies which the Constitution and statutes provide, especially 
in light of the important public interest in controlling government 
excesses. Indeed, the claims of these property owners might well 
be valid on the merits, if only it were appropriate to reach them. 
When the government takes private property it must pay just 
compensation. But Congress set out just how such plaintiffs may 
bring their suits; we have no right to second guess in the absence 
of congressional transgression of the Constitution.
It cannot seriously be doubted that Congress has the power to 
order that the government need not defend claims arising from the 
same operative facts simultaneously in several forums. That a 
commonly based suit is pending in the district court does not 
necessarily forever divest the Court of Federal Claims of 
jurisdiction over a claim; section 1500 decrees only that a party 
cannot maintain actions in both courts at the same time. It may 
sometimes happen that the district court challenge is not finished 
within six years, after which any Court of Federal Claims action 
would be barred. See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). But 
statutes limiting courts' jurisdiction will always work injustice 
in particular cases. Christianson. 486 U.S. at 818. See also 
Keene. 113 S. Ct. at 2045. This is not such a case, however, for 
Loveladies' district court action, including its appeal to the 
Court of Appeals for the Third circuit, was resolved within three
91-5050 7
years. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. Baldwin. Civ. No. 82-1948 
(D.N.J. March 12, 1984), aff'd 751 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1984). 
Loveladies still would have had three years in which to file its 
claim in the Court of Federal Claims for compensation after the 
resolution of its challenge to the permit denial.
As we said in UNR, "[i]t may have seemed unfair ’to deprive 
plaintiffs of the only forum they [had] in which to test their 
demand,' but that does not justify rewriting the statute." 962 
F.2d at 1022 (citation omitted). "Our individual appraisal of the 
wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by 
the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a 
statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its 
constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an 
end." TVA v. Hill. 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1977).3 In Keene, the 
Supreme Court suggested that efforts to reform section 1500 should
3 In words worthy of our consideration, the Court 
continued: "The lines ascribed to Sir Thomas More by Robert Bolt 
are not without relevance here:
The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal, not what's 
right. And I'll stick to what's legal. . . . I'm not 
God. The currents and eddies of right and wrong, which 
you find such plain-sailing, I can't navigate, I'm no 
voyager. But in the thickets of the law, oh there I'm 
a forester. . . . What would you do? Cut a great road 
through the law to get after the Devil? . . . And when 
the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you 
—  where would you hide, Roper, the laws being flat?
. . . This country's planted thick with laws from coast 
to coast —  Man's laws, not God's -—  and if you cut them 
down . . . d'you really think you could stand upright in 
the winds that would blow them? . . . Yes, I'd give the 
Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake.
437 U.S. at 195 (quoting R. Bolt, A Man for All Seasons, Act I, 
p. 147 (Three Plays, Heinemann ed. 1967)).
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be addressed to Congress. 113 S. Ct. at 2045. That was the point 
of UNR. and I still think so. In fact, a bill to do just that has 
been introduced. S. 1355, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
II.
Finally, the court's resurrection of Casman is not even 
supported by the facts of this case. The government argues that 
in both the district court and the Court of Federal Claims the 
complaints sought relief "[d]eclaring that the action of the 
defendant in denying the permit application of plaintiffs 
constitutes a taking of property in violation of plaintiffs' rights 
under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution." This 
is sufficient overlapping relief to make the question one of 
operative facts alone, even under this court's imaginative reading 
of Keene. See 113 S. Ct. at 2043 (relying on operative facts when 
there is "some overlap in the relief requested").
The court elides this argument by saying that we should ignore 
the words of the complaints —  language expressly requesting a 
declaration of a taking —  and substitute instead its understanding 
of what Loveladies must have intended by the several suits. It 
concludes that Loveladies did not seek overlapping relief because 
it must not have intended to request a "formal" declaration under 
the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988). For 
support, the court notes that Loveladies also requested damages in 
the Court of Federal Claims, while it requested none from the 
district court. It then cites the absence of any express reference
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to the Declaratory Judgment Act, and the lack of any evidence that 
the proceedings were conducted according to the rules governing 
proceedings under that act. Finally, the court points out that 
Loveladies had adequate remedies in both the district court and the 
Court of Federal Claims without either court declaring anything. 
From this, it supposes that Loveladies could not really have been 
requesting declaratory relief at all.
But declaratory relief is not some special, exclusive remedy; 
it is an additional form of relief, readily available even when it 
would be cumulative of other requested relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 
(allowing declaration of rights "whether or not further relief is 
or could be sought") ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 57 ("The existence of another 
adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief 
. . . ."). It is simply irrelevant that Loveladies asked for 
monetary relief in one forum and not in the other, and that either 
court could grant adequate relief aside from any declaration.
Nor is it surprising that Loveladies did not rely on the 
Declaratory Judgment Act as a basis for jurisdiction, since that 
act is not an independent source of federal jurisdiction. Skellv 
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950); 
Speedco, Inc. v. Estes, 853 F.2d 909, 911 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
Indeed, there is no special set of procedures governing declaratory 
judgment actions; they are controlled by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 57. Under those rules, Loveladies 
needed only to state facts adequate to support its request for 
relief; no ritualistic citation to the Declaratory Judgment Act 
was necessary.
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That said, the court's position reduces to a decision to 
ignore Loveladies' request for overlapping relief because it 
resulted from imprecise pleading, a mere oversight that we should 
excuse since the district court had no jurisdiction to address the 
takings allegation. But it makes no difference under section 1500 
whether there is subject matter jurisdiction in the district court, 
or not. See Frantz Equipment Co. v. United States. 98 F. Supp. 
579, 580 (Ct. Cl. 1951) ("The applicability of Sec. 1500 to the 
first claim of plaintiff, asserted in its petition herein, is not 
conditioned upon the question of whether the District Court had 
jurisdiction of the claim asserted by the plaintiff therein 
. . . ."). All that matters even under the court's new rule is 
that Loveladies had a suit pending in the district court seeking 
relief overlapping that requested in the Court of Federal Claims. 
That the district court ultimately dismissed the first count is 
irrelevant; it was pending when Loveladies filed suit in the Court 
of Federal Claims, so section 1500 applies.
The result of the court's machinations is to revive Brown v. 
United States. 358 F.2d 1002, 1005 (Ct. Cl. 1966), which said, 
"Section 1500 was not intended to compel claimants to elect, at 
their peril, between prosecuting their claim in this court (with 
conceded jurisdiction, aside from Section 1500) and in another 
tribunal which is without jurisdiction." But we overruled Brown 
in UNR, 962 F.2d at 1022, and in Keene the Supreme Court expressly 
agreed, 113 S. Ct. at 2045 & n.12.
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